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Causes  and  Solutions 
FOR THE SECOND TIME this decade, the thrift  industry  is in crisis. Once 
again thrift industry performance  is deteriorating,  failures are wide- 
spread, the regulators  are besieged, and Congress has passed major 
banking  legislation following protracted  debate. Indeed, the current 
difficulties  will be harder  and more costly to resolve than those of the 
early 1980s. The implications-for  competition in financial services, 
availability  of funds for housing, and federal  budget  expenditures-are 
profound. 
We  begin  our  paper  with  a review of the thrifts'  difficulties,  from  signs 
of trouble  in the 1970s  to the contemporary  attempts to shore up the 
deposit  insurance  fund.  In  doing  so, we show  how  regulatory  forbearance 
during the early 1980s turned an initial crisis, caused by the thrift 
industry's undiversified  portfolio of fixed-rate, long-term mortgages, 
into a near-disaster,  in which hundreds  of insolvent thrifts  continue to 
operate. We assess the policy response to the current  crisis and make 
recommendations  of our own.  Finally, we  show how the recently 
deregulated  thrift  industry  has been diversifying  and  moving  away from 
its traditional  role. We also discuss the outlook  for the thrift  industry  in 
the context of regulatory  reform,  innovation,  and competition. 
We would like to thank  the members  of the Brookings  Panel and James Barth  for 
helpful  comments  on an earlier  draft. 
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The Thrift Industry in Historical Perspective 
The thrift  industry  comprises  primarily  savings  and  loan associations 
and  mutual  savings  banks;  credit  unions  are sometimes  included.  Thrifts 
are generally distinguished  from commercial banks in that they are 
regulated  by different  agencies;  different  deposit  insurance  corporations 
guarantee their deposits; and their balance sheets have historically 
included  different  assets and  liabilities.  1 Thrifts,  which  have had  primar- 
ily long-term, fixed-rate assets, have relied principally on time and 
savings deposits for their  funding.  In contrast,  commercial  bank  assets 
have included  predominately  shorter-term  commercial  loans, and their 
liabilities have been more diverse, including demand deposits and 
nondeposit sources of funds. This paper focuses on savings and loan 
associations  and  savings  banks  whose deposits  are  insured  by the Federal 
Savings  and  Loan Insurance  Corporation  (FSLIC). 
Table 1  shows the number  and  assets of savings  and  loan  associations, 
mutual savings banks, and commercial  banks. At the end of 1986, 55 
percent of all U.S. financial  intermediaries'  assets were held by 3,987 
savings  institutions  with approximately  $1.4 trillion  in assets and 14,188 
banks  with approximately  $2.8 trillion  in assets.2 
Over  the past twenty-five  years, thrifts  have grown  more  rapidly  than 
banks. Despite a sharp  drop  in the number  of savings  institutions,  thrifts 
maintained  their share  of U.S. financial  intermediary  assets at about 19 
percent from 1960  to 1986,  while commercial  banking's  share dropped 
from  43 percent  to 37 percent. From 1960  to 1986,  the number  of thrifts 
fell approximately  40  percent,  from  6,835  to 3,987. Over  the same  period, 
the number  of commercial  banks  grew  8 percent,  from 13,126  to 14,188.3 
The  balance  sheets of thrifts  and  banks  have also changed.  Mortgages, 
which made up 13 percent of bank financial  assets in 1960, accounted 
for 19  percent  of those assets in 1986.  For savings  and  loan associations, 
1.  A summary of the regulatory structure of U.S.  depository institutions will be found 
in Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Agendafor  Reform (FHLBB,  1983), pp. 138-39. 
2.  U.S.  League of Savings Institutions, 87 Savings Institutions Sourcebook (Chicago: 
U.S.  League,  1987), pp. 46, 48, 49. 
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Table 1.  Number and Assets of Major Depository Institutions, Selected Years,  1970-86 
Assets  in billions of dollars 
Savings  and loan  Mutual savings 
End of  associations  banks  Commercial banks 
year  Number  Assets  Number  Assets  Number  Assets 
1970  5,669  176  494  79  13,511  576 
1975  4,931  338  476  121  14,385  965 
1980  4,613  630  463  172  14,435  1,704 
1985  3,197  949  666  326  14,404  2,484 
1986  3,132  963  855  444  14,188  2,800 
Source:  U.S.  League  of Savings  Institutions,  87 Savinigs Inistituitions  Sourcebook  (Chicago:  U.S.  League,  1987), 
pp. 46, 48-49,  63. 
mortgages  as a share of financial  assets fell steadily  from 73 percent in 
1960  to 51  percent  in 1986.  Time  and  savings  deposits  at banks  have risen 
from 32 percent of financial  assets in 1960  to 51 percent in 1986. The 
share  of such accounts at thrifts  declined  from 88 percent in 1960  to 79 
percent  by 1986.4 
Thus, thrifts  have gained  substantial  increased  control  over financial 
assets in the United  States, while  the balance-sheet  distinctions  between 
thrifts  and  commercial  banks  have been eroding.  Thrifts'  importance  to 
the U.S. economy has risen dramatically  in another  sense: the number 
of failed and insolvent thrifts  insured  by the Federal  Savings and Loan 
Insurance  Corporation  jumped from 52 in 1980  to 551 in 1986, and the 
assets involved rose from $3 billion to $140 billion.5  As table 2 shows, 
the number  of bank  failures also rose substantially,  from 10 in 1980  to 
144 in 1986. Both the number  of failures and the assets of the failed 
banks, however, are well below those for the thrift industry. What 
precipitated  and continues to cause the thrift industry  crisis, and the 
implications  for regulatory  reform,  are the focus of the remainder  of the 
paper. 
4. Federal  Reserve  Board,  Flow of Funds  Accounts. 
5. An institution  fails when the appropriate  regulator  closes it and either sells the 
institution  or liquidates  its assets. Almost  all closures  are the result  of insolvency, which 
for  regulatory  purposes  occurs  when  the historical  cost (or  book value)  of an institution's 
assets falls below the book value of the institution's  liabilities. Since 1980, a growing 
number  of thrift  institutions  have been allowed to remain  open even though  they were 
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Table 2.  Number and Assets of Failed and Insolvent Thrifts and Banks,  1980-86 
Assets  in billions of dollars 
Failures  and insolvencies 
of FSLIC-insured  thrift  Failures  of FDIC-insured 
institutions  commercial  banks 
Year  Number  Assets  Number  Assets 
1980  52  3.0  10  0.2 
1981  146  32.4  10  4.9 
1982  453  95.5  42  11.6 
1983  389  95.5  48  7.2 
1984  475  112.1  79  3.3 
1985  536  136.3  118  n.a. 
1986  551  140.0  144  n.a. 
Source:  R. Dan Brumbaugh, Jr., Thrifts under Siege: Restorinig Order to Anerican  Banking (Ballinger, forthcoming), 
table 3-2; Edwin  J. Gray,  Chairman,  Federal  Home  Loan  Bank Board (FHLBB),  letter to  Sen.  William Proxmire 
(May  15, 1987), tables 2 and 15; and "200 Banks Facing  Failure This Year,"  Washitngtont  Post,  May 22,  1987. 
n.a.  Not  available. 
The Plight of the Thrift Institutions, 1979-82 
The Federal  Savings  and  Loan Insurance  Corporation  was created  in 
1934  to guarantee  deposits in thrift  institutions.  In 1941,  thirteen  insured 
thrift  institutions  failed. Thereafter,  until 1980, the number  of failures 
reached  ten only twice. This  remarkable  stability  ended  abruptly  in 1980, 
when thirty-five  thrifts  failed. Of the total 890  failures  of FSLIC-insured 
thrift  institutions  from  1934  through  1986,  75  percent  occurred  from 1980 
through  1986.6 
Warning  signals  in the 1970s  went  largely  unheeded.  During  the 1960s, 
thrift  industry  net worth  ranged  from  6.5 percent  to 7.0 percent  of assets, 
but between 1970  and 1979,  net worth  rates dropped  from 7.04 percent 
to 5.64 percent.7  The decline  reflected  the effects of rising  interest  rates, 
which  pushed  up  the cost of deposits  faster  than  the thrifts  could  increase 
interest rates on mortgages.  Thrifts  faced substantial  interest rate risk 
because  fixed-rate  mortgages,  which  made  up  nearly  80  percent  of thrifts' 
assets in the 1970s,  repriced  at lengthier  intervals  than did deposits. In 
6. Federal  Home  Loan  Bank  Board,  unpublished  data,  as reported  in James  R. Barth, 
R. Dan Brumbaugh,  Jr., Daniel Sauerhaft,  and George H. K. Wang, "Insolvency and 
Risk-Taking  in the Thrift  Industry:  Implications  for the Future," Contemporary  Policy 
Issues, vol. 3 (Fall 1985),  table  A-2, p. 24. 
7.  U.S. League,  Sourcebook,  pp. 56-57. R. Dan Brumbaugh, Jr. and Andrew S.  Carson  353 
addition,  beginning  in 1972,  money  market  mutual  funds  began  to provide 
higher-yielding  accounts that were close substitutes  for some thrift  and 
bank  accounts. 
Regulatory  constraints  limited  the ability  of thrifts  and  banks  to adapt. 
A form  of price  controls  known  as Regulation  Q set interest  rate  ceilings 
on deposit accounts. Designed to reduce thrifts' interest rate risk by 
stabilizing  the cost of funds, Regulation  Q triggered  brief periods of 
disintermediation  during  the 1960s  and 1970s  whenever  market  interest 
rates rose above the controlled  rates. Interest  rate restrictions  began  to 
be relaxed in 1978, when federal regulators  authorized  market-related 
interest rates on a money market  certificate  account with a six-month 
term and minimum  deposit of $10,000. Within a year, this account 
represented  20 percent of total thrift deposits. Assets were also con- 
strained.  Until the beginning  of the 1980s,  variable-rate  mortgages  were 
limited  to state-chartered  thrifts  in certain  states. 
With tight regulatory  controls in incipient  relaxation  in 1979, thrift 
institutions  were extremely  vulnerable  to interest  rate increases when, 
in October, the Federal Reserve began to focus on money aggregates 
instead  of interest  rates as a tool to reduce inflation.8  Interest  rates rose 
substantially. Savings and loan associations' average cost of funds, 
8. One way to measure  how rising  interest  rates increase liability  costs for a thrift 
institution  before  the return  on assets rises is to calculate  interest  rate  "gaps." An  interest 
rate  gap  is calculated  by subtracting  the dollar  volume  of liabilities  repricing  in one year, 
for example,  from  the dollar  volume  of assets repricing  in the year. This number  is then 
divided  by the institution's  total  assets, giving  the percent  of liabilities  in excess of assets 
that reprice  in a year. The hedged gap accounts for the use of options and futures in 
reducing  interest  rate risk. Whenever  repricing  liabilities  for a period  exceed repricing 
assets the  gap  will  be a negative  number.  The  convention,  however,  is to drop  the negative 
sign. 
Data  to calculate  directly  the thrift  industry's  interest  rate  gap were unavailable  until 
March  1984.  At that  time,  the  industry's  one-year,  hedged  interest  rate  gap  was  40  percent. 
That  means  that  40 percent  of all thrift  liabilities  repriced  in one year after  having  netted 
out assets repricing  in one year. Using income data, thrift  cost of funds, and industry 
assets, one can indirectly  estimate  the industry  interest  rate  gap near  the beginning  of the 
decade  to have  been approximately  72 percent. 
Estimated  indirectly,  the interest  rate  gap  equals  the change  in income  due to changed 
interest  rates  divided  by the change  in interest  rates  times  total  assets. In 1981  the  industry 
lost $7,114  million  (operating  income)  on $651,068  million  in assets when thrifts'  cost of 
funds  rose 150  basis  points:  0.72 = 7,114/(0.015)(651,068).  Data  on income  from  table  2-1; 
assets, table 2-2; and cost of funds, figure  2-1, in R. Dan Brumbaugh,  Jr., Thrifts  iunder 
Siege: Restoring Order to American Banking (Ballinger, forthcoming). 354  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
which had  been 7 percent  in 1978,  rose to more  than 11  percent  in 1982.9 
During 1981  and 1982,  the epicenter  of the first  thrift  industry  crisis of 
the 1980s,  the cost of funds  exceeded the average  return  on mortgages.10 
In 1980, average rates paid by money market mutual funds were 
approximately  3 percentage  points higher  than  the average  rates  paid  by 
thrifts  to depositors  and  other  liability  holders. By 1981,  the differential 
was approximately  5 percentage  points. Over six quarters  in 1981-82, 
withdrawals  at thrifts  exceeded new deposits  by more  than  $34  billion.  1 
Crippling  disintermediation  was a possibility. 
During  the first  three years of the 1980s,  the industry  was selling its 
best assets to bolster profitability  and reported  net worth. To counter 
net operating losses  of $16 billion during 1981-82, the thrifts sold 
appreciated  assets that were valued on their balance sheets at original 
cost and recorded  the gains as nonoperating  income. Net nonoperating 
income rose from $496 million in 1980  to $957 million in 1981  and $3 
billion  in 1982.  Further  asset sales produced  $2.5 billion  in nonoperating 
income in 1983. These tactics reduced total losses after taxes to $4.6 
billion in 1981  and $4.3 billion in 1982. The industry  had positive net 
income of $2 billion  in 1983.12 
The return  to profitability  was, for many firms, more apparent  than 
real  and  reflected  the incentives  and  effects not only of using  book-value, 
as opposed to market-value,  accounting, but also of using regulatory 
accounting principles (RAP). Although both RAP and the generally 
accepted accounting  principles  (GAAP)  that apply to most public cor- 
porations  rely primarily  on historical  rather  than market  values, RAP is 
generally  more  liberal  in  recognizing  income  and  assets.  13 The difference 
among the various net worth measures can be dramatic.  In 1982, for 
9.  FHLBB, "ARM  Index  Rates" (August  14, 1987). 
10.  Andrew  S.  Carron, The Plight  of the Thrift Institutions  (Brookings,  1982), pp. 
11-21. 
11.  Andrew S. Carron, The Rescue  of the Thrift  Industiy (Brookings,  1983), p. 9. 
12.  U.S.  League, Sourcebook,  p. 50. 
13. RAP net worth  includes  preferred  stock; permanent,  reserve, or guaranty  stock; 
paid-in surplus; qualifying  mutual capital certificates;  income capital and net worth 
certificates;  qualifying  subordinated  debentures;  appraised  equity capital;  reserves;  un- 
divided  profits  (retained  earnings);  and  net  undistributed  income.  GAAP  net  worth  excludes 
from  this  list  qualifying  mutual  capital  certificates;  income  capital  and  net  worth  certificates; 
qualifying  subordinated  debentures;  and appraised  equity capital. GAAP net worth 
includes  deferred  net gains  (losses) on assets sold. R. Dan Brumbaugh, Jr. and Andrew S.  Carron  355 
example,  industrywide  RAP  net worth  was 3.69  percent  of assets. GAAP 
net worth  was 2.95 percent. Tangible  net worth, which subtracts  intan- 
gible assets from  GAAP  net worth, was 0.54 percent. Estimated  market 
value net worth  was - 12.03  percent.  14 
These distinctions are important  because the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board  uses the level of RAP net worth  to judge whether  a thrift  is 
healthy and whether it should be more closely scrutinized.  A thrift  is 
categorized  as a "  supervisory  case" when its RAP  net worth  falls below 
a specified percentage  of liabilities, typically 3 percent. When a thrift 
becomes a supervisory  case, the Bank  Board  can exercise broad  control 
over it, but  the Bank  Board  generally  does not close a thrift  until  its RAP 
net worth  is zero or negative. When  difficulties  arise, thrifts  thus have a 
strong incentive to sell assets with positive market  value to augment 
income and minimize the decline of RAP net worth. Worse, under 
current  conditions,  a closed institution  will almost  always  have negative 
market  value.  15 
The Regulatory  Response to the First Crisis 
The regulatory  response  to the problems  of the early 1980s  proceeded 
along  two lines:  portfolio  deregulation  and  relaxed  safety and  soundness 
controls. In retrospect, it is apparent  that the relaxation of controls 
caused, or at least facilitated,  the current  crisis. 
Congress  passed the Depository Institutions  Deregulation  and Mon- 
etary  Control  Act in 1980.  The act established  a committee  to phase out 
interest  rate  ceilings  on deposits  by March  1986.  It also provided  broader 
asset powers. Nationwide  interest-bearing  transaction  accounts, the so- 
called  NOW  accounts,  were introduced  in 1980.  In 1981,  the Bank  Board 
authorized  federally  chartered  thrifts  to make,  purchase,  and  participate 
in adjustable-rate  mortgages. To help thrifts attract new capital, the 
Board  liberalized  rules  governing  conversion  from  mutual  to stock form 
in 1981. In 1982, Congress passed the Garn-St Germain  Depository 
14. Brumbaugh,  Thrifts  under  Siege, table  2-7  and  appendix  table  2-1. 
15. This  closure  rule  has been  described  as a call option  exercised  by the Bank  Board 
only when it is out of the money. See R. Dan Brumbaugh  and Eric Hemel, "Federal 
Deposit Insurance  as a Call Option:  Implications  for Depository  Institution  and Insurer 
Behavior,"  Research  Working  Paper  116  (FHLBB, October  1984). 356  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
Institutions  Act, which  further  expanded  thrift  asset powers. In  addition, 
at the state level, Florida expanded state-chartered  thrift investment 
powers in 1980,  as Maine  had  done in 1975,  and  Texas, in 1972. 
These deregulatory  reactions allowed thrifts to begin to adapt to 
changing  market  conditions.  A second regulatory  reaction  took the form 
of forbearance:  relaxed supervision and delayed closure of capital- 
impaired  thrifts.  The minimum  RAP  net worth  requirement  was lowered 
from  5 percent  to 4 percent  in 1980  and  to 3 percent  in 1982.  Fewer low- 
net-worth  institutions  thus became supervisory  cases. In 1981, thrifts 
were permitted  to defer losses on the sale of selected assets and to 
include  qualifying  mutual  capital  certificates  (MCCs)  and  income  capital 
certificates  (ICCs)  in RAP net worth. MCCs  and ICCs were issued by 
the FSLIC in exchange for promissory notes from weakened thrifts. 
Similar  net worth certificates  (NWCs) were introduced  in 1982.  These 
provisions further  cheapened the net worth requirement  and reduced 
once again the number of RAP-insolvent  thrifts or thrifts subject to 
supervisory  control. 
Although  the deregulation  of assets and  liabilities  helped  cushion  the 
effects of rising interest rates, deregulation  alone would have been 
insufficient  to avert  an industrywide  collapse. Altering  the cost structure 
and  portfolio  mix of an industry  requires  years. What  saved the industry 
was the unexpected and large decline in interest rates in 1982. Money 
market  rates fell from their  peak of over 16 percent to below 9 percent 
in 1983.16  After a slight increase in 1984, they continued  their decline 
through  1986.  Thrifts'  costs of funds  fell below the return  on their  assets 
in 1982,  for the first  time in the 1980s,  and  the gap widened  thereafter. 
Current Status of FSLIC-Insured  Thrift Institutions 
Despite  declining  interest  rates  after  1984,  the condition  of many  thrift 
institutions continued to deteriorate. The number of RAP-insolvent 
thrifts-those with RAP net worth  of zero or less-rose  steadily  from  80 
in 1982  to 251 in 1986;  on a GAAP  basis, the number  of institutions  with 
net worth  of zero or less rose from  201  in 1982  to 468 in 1986  (table  3). In 
1986,  an additional  346  institutions  had  RAP  net worth  between zero and 
16.  Carron, The Rescue  of the Thlr  ift Industry, p. 3. R. Dan Brumbaugh, Jr. and Andrew S.  Carron  357 
Table 3.  FSLIC-Insured Thrift Failures and Insolvencies and FSLIC Reserves, 1980-86 
Assets and reserves in billions  of dollars 
GAAP insolvent 
Failed  institutions  institutions  Weak institutionsa  FSLIC 
Year  Number  Assets  Number  Assets  Number  Assets  reserves 
1980  35  2.9  17  0.1  280  35.1  6.5 
1981  81  15.1  65  17.3  653  126.7  6.2 
1982  252  46.8  201  48.7  842  204.3  6.3 
1983  102  16.6  287  78.9  883  242.7  6.4 
1984  41  5.8  434  107.3  856  350.4  6.0 
1985  70  6.5  466  129.8  673  270.1  7.5b 
1986  83  13.8  468  126.2  515  255.1  3.6b 
Source:  FHLBB  as  reported  in Brumbaugh,  Thrifts unlder Siege,  table  3-2.  FSLIC  reserves  from U.S.  League, 
Sourcebook,  p. 63. 
a.  GAAP net worth between  zero and 3 percent of assets. 
b.  As of September  30. 
3 percent; 515 institutions  had GAAP net worth between zero and 3 
percent. In total,  18 percent ($211 billion) of thrift assets were in 
institutions at or below 3 percent RAP net worth; 33 percent ($381 
billion)  of thrift  assets were in institutions  with GAAP net worth of 3 
percent  or less.  17 
Essentially,  since 1982,  the  thrift  industry  has  existed in  two segments. 
One segment,  the 983 FSLIC-insured  thrifts  with 1986  GAAP  net worth 
of 3 percent or less, consists of insolvent and nearly insolvent thrifts 
whose performance  has  declined  despite  improving  interest  rates.  Within 
this  group,  341  institutions  with  $93  billion  in  assets were  GAAP  insolvent 
and earning  negative net income in 1986, up from 229 institutions  the 
previous  year. The second segment,  the remaining  2,237  FSLIC-insured 
thrift  institutions  with assets of $784 billion, largely produced  the net 
income that has slightly bolstered the industry's aggregate  net worth 
since 1982.  (See table  4.) 
The  faltering  segment  of the industry  benefited  from  the fall  in interest 
rates  but suffered  from  a coinciding  deflation  in real estate, primarily  in 
the Southwest,  particularly  in Texas. The Southwest  was also buffeted 
by falling  oil prices. Difficulties  in agriculture  and timber  also affected 
regional  economic  performance.  In the affected  areas, many  thrifts  that 
had sold assets to produce nonoperating  income before 1982  were left 
17. FHLBB, unpublished  data,  as reported  in Brumbaugh,  Thrifts  under  Siege, tables 
2-5  and  2-6. 358  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1987 
Table 4.  Earnings at FSLIC-Insured Thrift Institutions, 1985:1-87:2 
Billions of dollars  except where noted 
Slhare of firms 
Net  income of  Losses  of  profitable 
Period  profitable firms  unprofitable firms  (percent) 
1985:1  1.2  0.7  71 
1985:2  2.0  0.9  83 
1985:3  1.9  0.8  81 
1985:4  2.3  1.2  79 
1986:1  2.5  0.9  81 
1986:2  2.3  2.1  79 
1986:3  2.0  2.1  77 
1986:4  2.3  3.2  74 
1987:1  2.2  2.1  n.a. 
1987:2  1.6  3.3  n.a. 
Source:  FHLBB,  "Fourth Quarter Earnings at FSLIC-Insured Thrift Institutions"  (April 17, 1987); "U.S.-Insured 
S&Ls'  Losses  Were $1.6 Billion in Period,"  Wall Street Journlal, September  28,  1987. 
n.a.  Not  available. 
with deteriorating  assets after 1982.  Even institutions  that survived  the 
early 1980s  without asset sales were financially  weakened by deflation 
and regional  recession. 
The continuing  deterioration  of the thrift  industry  has left regulators 
unable  to cope with  the  problem.  Ironically,  one symptom  of the FSLIC's 
helplessness is the reduction  in the number  of thrifts  it closes each year. 
As table 3 shows, the number  of closures dropped  from  a peak of 252 in 
1982 to 102 in 1983  and even fewer in subsequent years-a  drop that 
reflects the FSLIC's inability to pay the sums necessary to close an 
institution, not a decline in the number of insolvent thrifts. FSLIC 
reserves were stable  at an average  level of $6.4  billion  from 1980  through 
1983. By 1985, the estimated cost to close all GAAP-insolvent  thrift 
institutions  was $15.8  billion.  18 
Regulatory  examination,  supervision, and enforcement staffs have 
also been overwhelmed.  The number  of Bank  Board  examiners  fell from 
917  in 1982  to 891  in 1983  to 849  in 1984.19  Although  the FSLIC staff  grew 
from  34 in 1980  to 159  in 1985,  over half  the staff  had  less than  two years' 
experience.20 
18. Edwin  J. Gray,  Chairman,  Federal  Home  Loan  Bank  Board,  letter  to Sen. William 
Proxmire  (May  15, 1987),  table 13. 
19.  Brumbaugh, Thrifts under Siege,  chap. 2, p. 22. 
20. Barth,  Brumbaugh,  Sauerhaft,  and  Wang,  "Insolvency  and  Risk-Taking,"  p. 3. R. Dan Brumbaugh, Jr. and Andrew S.  Carron  359 
Causes of the Problem 
The cause of the current  thrift  problems  is the moral  hazard  inherent 
in the deposit insurance  system. Deposit insurance  has been priced  by 
statute  at a flat  percentage  rate  (essentially  one-twelfth  of one percent  of 
total deposits) since its inception. The problem is that the insurance 
premium  is set without regard  to an institution's  probability  of failure, 
the risk  of its portfolio,  or the estimated  cost to the insurer  should  it fail. 
The FSLIC  and  Federal  Deposit Insurance  Corporation  have attempted 
to offset the moral  hazard  primarily  with capital  requirements,  regula- 
tion, examination,  supervision,  and enforcement. 
Capital  requirements  are intended  to induce  risk-averse  behavior  (as 
do deductibles  in casualty  insurance)  and  to act as buffer  against  capital 
erosion due to unexpected  adverse economic difficulties.  Regulation  is 
put in place to discourage  specific  conduct  perceived  by the regulator  to 
be excessively risky. Examination and supervision are designed to 
monitor  compliance  with regulations.  Enforcement  is supposed  to deter 
noncompliance  through  the threat  of legal action. 
For thrifts, this entire mechanism had foundered by  1982. Even 
though  the FSLIC closed a record number  of insolvent institutions  in 
1982, it left a record 201 open, giving the owners and managements 
incentive  to take risks. Gains  from  risk, after  all, accrue to owners and 
managers  while losses accrue to the insurer.  But the incentive to take 
greater  risk does not exist only at insolvency but at other levels of 
decreasing  net worth. As an institution  nears the level of net worth at 
which it will become a supervisory case, it may be tempted to take 
increased  risks to avoid supervisory  control. As it approaches  insol- 
vency, it may try to avoid that by taking  greater  risks. In 1982, 1,824 
FSLIC-insured  institutions with 60 percent of industry assets ($504 
billion)  were failing  the RAP net worth  requirement  that had applied  in 
1980.21  Thus, a majority  of the thrifts  had reached  net worth levels low 
enough  to create  incentives  for greater  risk  taking. 
If more thrifts  had been shareholder-owned,  deposit insurance  had 
21. FHLBB, unpublished  data, as reported  in Brumbaugh,  Thrifts  under  Siege, table 
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not existed, and  information  had  been freely  available,  the market  would 
have imposed  discipline.  Stock  prices would  have adjusted  to reflect  the 
market  values of assets and  liabilities,  and  general  creditors  would  have 
taken control of insolvent institutions. Management  would thus have 
had  less incentive  to take  risks  and  to use book-value  accounting  methods 
to inflate  accounting  income. 
In 1980, stock thrifts (both public and private) composed only 20 
percent  of the thrift  industry  and  held  27 percent  of industry  assets. With 
96 percent of industry  liabilities  in insured  deposits, insured  creditors 
had no direct incentive to monitor  thrifts'  conduct and performance.22 
And since uninsured creditors had been paid the full value of their 
liabilities  by the FSLIC  when it closed an institution,  even they had  little 
direct incentive to monitor thrifts. Most important, the FSLIC, the 
general creditor with the most to lose  in thrift insolvencies, made 
decisions  based  on RAP.  There  were abundant  incentives  for  institutions 
to maximize  RAP net worth. 
The extent to which deregulation  may be contributing  to the current 
problem  depends  upon  the effects of the interaction  of deregulation  with 
increasing  insolvency and is difficult  to determine. Deregulation  pro- 
vided insolvent institutions  with additional  asset and liability pricing 
structures  with which to take greater  risks. Several studies have evalu- 
ated econometrically  the effect of such new asset categories as direct 
investments  (equity  investments  and  direct  investment  in real  estate) on 
both  the probability  of failure  for an  institution  and  the cost to the FSLIC 
once an institution  fails.23  No study has found an association between 
the probability  of failure  and direct investments. Some, but not all, of 
the studies  have found  a positive association  between FSLIC costs and 
direct investment  in the portfolios  of closed thrifts. In the most recent 
such study, the average  time elapsed  between GAAP  insolvency  for the 
22. Ibid., tables 1-5  and  2-10. 
23. James  R. Barth,  R. Dan Brumbaugh,  Jr., and  Daniel  Sauerhaft,  "Failure  Costs of 
Government-Regulated  Financial  Firms:  The Case of the Thrift  Institutions,"  Research 
Working  Paper 123  (FHLBB, October 1986);  James R. Barth, R. Dan Brumbaugh,  Jr., 
Daniel  Sauerhaft,  and  George  H. K. Wang,  "Thrift  Institution  Failures:  Causes  and  Policy 
Issues," Proceedings  of a Conference on Bank Structure  and Competition  (Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago, 1985),  pp. 184-216;  George  J. Benston, "An Analysis of the 
Causes of Savings and Loan Association Failures," Monograph  Series in Finance and 
Economics, 1985-4/5  (Salomon  Brothers  Center  for the Study of Financial  Institutions, 
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institutions  and closure was eleven months. The implication  is that the 
incentives caused by insolvency, rather  than inherent risks of direct 
investments,  may have been the problem. 
Finally, failure to close insolvent thrifts created incentives to take 
excessive risks  across  the asset and  liability  frontier.  Reducing  minimum 
net worth requirements  also allowed low net worth institutions,  which 
would  have otherwise  been subject  to supervisory  status, to take  greater 
risks,  and  abetted  adverse  selectionby  increasingleverage  opportunities. 
Regulatory  Response to the Changing Thrift Industry Crisis 
From  the beginning  of the thrift  crisis  until  March  1985,  the regulator  y 
response to the growing  number  of insolvent thrifts  focused on interest 
rate risk. In 1983,  thrifts  were allowed to extend the maturities  of their 
liabilities  by borrowing  from the Federal Home Loan Banks for up to 
twenty, instead of ten, years. A  1984 rule required thrift boards of 
directors  to establish  an interest  rate  risk  policy. Throughout  the period, 
the Bank  Board  encouraged  the use of adjustable-rate  mortgages. 
When the problems of credit risk began to eclipse the difficulties 
associated with interest rate risk, the regulatory  response focused on 
asset and liability restrictions. In 1984, the Bank Board proposed a 
regulation  (later declared illegal by a federal court and never imple- 
mented)  to limit  the use of broker-originated  deposits  by high-risk-taking 
insolvent  thrifts  paying  rates  above industry  averages.  The intent  was to 
confine the taking of risks to thrifts with the ability, not merely the 
willingness,  to take them. 
The first  three  regulations  dealing  with greater  risk taking  by FSLIC- 
insured  thrifts  were adopted by the Bank Board in March 1985. One 
regulation  generally  limited  direct  investments  to 10  percent  of assets or 
twice net worth, whichever was greater. The board also required 
additional  net worth  for thrifts  growing  more than 15  percent  a year. In 
addition,  the Bank  Board  began  phasing  out techniques  that  had  permit- 
ted certain  thrifts  to maintain  minimum  net worth requirements  below 
the 3 percent  level applying  to the industry  as a whole. 
In 1986  and  again  in  June 1987  the Bank  Board  extended  and  tightened 
the direct-investment  regulation.  The final  regulation  was applicable  to 
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investments. In 1986,  the Bank Board  also required  a gradual  increase 
in minimum  net worth  from  3 percent  to 6 percent  RAP net worth. 
Finally,  in  August  1987,  President  Reagan  signed  into  law  the  Financial 
Institutions  Competitive  Equality  Act of 1987.  Included  in the law is an 
"FSLIC Recapitalization"  provision, developed by the Treasury  De- 
partment  and the Bank Board, that authorizes  the Federal  Home Loan 
Bank System to establish a financing  corporation  to borrow funds on 
behalf  of the FSLIC  to close insolvent  thrifts.  To pay back  the principal, 
a portion of the bank system's capital will be used to purchase zero- 
coupon bonds pledged to principal repayment. The interest on the 
borrowings  is scheduled  to be paid  from  regular  and  supplemental  deposit 
insurance premiums  paid by insured thrifts. To prevent thrifts from 
changing  insurance  corporations  in order  to escape paying the supple- 
mental  premium,  another  provision  established  a one-year moratorium 
on thrifts seeking to switch from FSLIC to FDIC coverage.4 The act 
also lowered to 0.5 percent the minimum  net worth requirement  for 
thrifts whose financial  difficulties  have been caused by deteriorating 
regional  economic conditions  rather  than  by imprudent  management. 
Solving the Problem: Who Will Pay? How Much? 
There  is little dispute  that  current  closure  policy actually  encourages 
insolvent  thrifts  to take  great  risks  to survive.  Nor is there  much  argument 
that the Bank Board's risk-control mechanism is overwhelmed and 
inadequate  to control risk taking  by insolvent thrifts. Valid questions, 
however, do exist about the size of the problem, how much money is 
required  to cure it, how quickly  the money should  be raised and spent, 
and whose money should  be used-the  thrifts', commercial  banks', or 
taxpayers'. 
MAGNITUDE  OF  THE  PROBLEM 
At a minimum,  the 341  FSLIC-insured  thrift  institutions  with  negative 
GAAP net worth and earning negative net income at year-end 1986 
represent  a baseline from which to measure  the extent of the problem. 
24. Joint Explanatory  Statement  of the Committee  of Conference, Congressional 
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These institutions  had $93 billion  in assets, a negative  GAAP net worth 
of $10.1  billion,  and  a negative  net income of $3 billion.25 
From 1980  through  1983,  the FSLIC's average  actual  resolution  cost 
as a percentage  of assets of closed thrifts  was 7.2 percent. In 1984, it 
rose to 14.7  percent  and  was 14.5  percent  in 1985.26  The cost increase  in 
part  reflected  the deteriorating  asset quality  of closed institutions.  Most 
closings early in the period  were due to interest  rates, and the effect of 
rising  interest rates was relatively  easy to calculate. Calculation  of the 
value of institutions  with asset-quality  problems is more difficult  and 
uncertain,  leading  to higher  FSLIC costs. 
In 1986,  the FSLIC estimated  that  it cost, on average,  23.5 percent  of 
the total assets of a closed institution to  resolve a FSLIC case.27 
Multiplying  this closure cost ratio  by the assets of unprofitable  GAAP- 
insolvent  thrifts  in 1986  suggests that the cost to close these thrifts  will 
be $21.9 billion. The $11.8 billion dollar  difference  between the GAAP 
net worth of these institutions and the estimated cost of resolution 
suggests the difference between GAAP and market-value  net worth. 
Because  generally  accepted  accounting  principles  can  inflate  profitability 
and  other  performance  indexes, and  because  weakened  thrift  institutions 
have incentives  to do so, it is not unreasonable  to use all  GAAP-insolvent 
thrifts  in 1986  to expand  the baseline  estimate  of the size of the problem. 
At year-end  1986,  there  were 468  GAAP-insolvent  institutions  with $126 
billion in assets. Based on the 1986 FSLIC estimate of the cost of 
resolving  a case, the cost to close them  all would be $29.6 billion. 
At the same time that thrift  insolvencies were increasing  in the weak 
segment  of the industry, new capital was pouring  into healthy institu- 
tions. Many institutions  with mutual  charters (depositor-owned)  con- 
verted to the stock form of organization.  In 1980 stock thrifts  held 27 
percent  of industry  assets; by 1986  that share  had risen to 62 percent.28 
This  trend  is further  evidence of the split  of the thrift  industry  into haves 
and have-nots. It is also an indication that a charter to run a thrift 
institution  is valued by the market,  despite the well-known  difficulties 
of the industry. 
With the liberalization  of thrift operating  powers, many financial 
25. FHLBB, unpublished  data,  as reported  in Brumbaugh,  Thrifts  under  Siege, table 
3-1. 
26. Ibid.,  table  2-9. 
27. Ibid. 
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activities can be undertaken  as easily by a thrift as by a commercial 
bank. Becauise  thrifts have lower capital requirements  and, in many 
instances, more liberal operating  authority  than commercial  banks, a 
thrift  charter  has become a bargain  compared  with a -bank  charter.  With 
a relatively modest investment, a new thrift  owner can gain access to 
insured  deposits, substantial  leverage, limited downside risk, and the 
potential for large gains. In financial terms, purchase of a thrift is 
tantamount  to buying  an inexpensive  option  on interest  rate  futures,  real 
estate values, or some other  asset within  the purview  of a thrift  charter. 
RECAPITALIZATION  OF  THE  FSLIC 
The intention  of the 1987  Financial  Institutions  Competitive  Equality 
Act was to enable  the FSLIC to pay the cost of liquidating  the insolvent 
thrifts  from  the proceeds  of bonds  issued by its newly created  Financing 
Corporation  (FICO).  The FICO  is to be capitalized  by an infusion  of up 
to $3 billion  from  the Federal  Home Loan Banks. A total of $10.8  billion 
in bonds may be issued by the FICO, with not more than $3.75 billion 
issued each year. The FICO's capital will be used to pay back the 
principal  on the bonds  through  the purchase  of zero-coupon  government 
and corporate  bonds. Semiannual  interest  will be paid  out of the regular 
and supplemental  thrift  industry  deposit insurance  premiums. 
The first $500 million in FICO bonds, issued in September 1987, 
yielded 10.73  percent  to maturity,  approximately  90 basis points above 
comparable-maturity  U.S. Treasury  bonds. At a yield of 10.73  percent 
and a price of par, the present value of the principal  paid at maturity  is 
only 4.35 percent of the face amount of a thirty-year  bond and 35.16 
percent for a ten-year  bond;  coupon interest  payments account  for the 
remainder.29  Thus the value of the bonds is largely dependent  on the 
availability  of deposit  insurance  premiums  to make  interest  payments. 
It is possible that future FICO issues will have lower yields, which 
would reduce future  claims on deposit insurance  premiums.  If the rate 
dropped  to, say, 10.00  percent,  annual  interest  on $10.8  billion  would  be 
$1.08 billion. Total annual  deposit insurance  premiums  for 1987,  based 
on average  deposits in insured  institutions  during  the first  six months  of 
29. Authors'  calculations  based  on semiannual  compounding  at the quoted  yield, and 
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the year, are estimated at $1.86 billion.30  The estimated debt-service 
coverage  would  be 1.7, which  would  be ample.  But even if interest  rates 
decline as assumed, two critical assumptions  remain:  first, that there 
will be no claims on deposit insurance  premiums,  other than for debt 
service, over the next thirty  years;  and  second, that  the level of deposits 
will not decline over the next thirty  years. Both assumptions  are open 
to question. 
That there will be no new claims on the insurance premiums is 
unlikely. Our  estimates of the total cost to close insolvent institutions 
substantially  exceed the $10.8  billion  available  through  recapitalization. 
The recent volatility in the thrift industry's performance  and in the 
economic conditions  affecting  the industry  indicate  that the cost could 
escalate substantially.  It seems reasonable  to conclude that an annual 
expenditure  of $3.75  billion  for two years and $3.3 billion  in a third  year 
may  barely  keep  up  with  the rate  of growth  of the cost of closing  insolvent 
thrifts. It is also likely that new problems will develop and require 
expenditures  by the FSLIC. 
Nor will the deposit base of the thrift  industry  necessarily  grow as it 
has in the past. From 1982  to 1985, deposits at FSLIC-insured  thrifts 
grew at an average annual rate of 15.0 percent. In 1986, the deposit 
growth  rate  was 5.5 percent. During  the first  half of 1987,  deposits rose 
at an annual  rate of only 1.6 percent.31  Higher  capital requirements  on 
incremental  assets, increased  competition,  and the potential  transfer  of 
thrifts  from  FSLIC  to FDIC  coverage  could  further  slow or even reverse 
the growth  trend. 
Table 5 shows the results of an exercise to determine  the sensitivity 
of FICO debt coverage to these two assumptions. (Debt coverage is 
defined here as the present value of projected insurance premiums 
divided by the present value of projected interest payments, both 
discounted  at 10 percent annually.)  The left-hand  column shows alter- 
native deposit growth rates for the industry; the remaining  column 
headings  show alternative  levels of additions  to the FSLIC caseload, 
expressed as a percentage of industry deposits. A $1 billion a year 
increase  in the cost of resolving  the problems  of insolvent thrifts  would 
30. Authors'  calculations  based on FHLBB, "Thrift  Institution  Activity in June" 
(August  11, 1987),  table 1. 
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Table 5.  Debt Coverage Ratio for the FSLIC Financing Corporation under Alternative 
Economic Assumptionsa 
Annual  deposit  Annual increase  in problem  cases  as percent  of deposits  growth rate 
(percent)  0.00  0.05  0.10  0.15  0.20 
-  10  0.82  0.62  0.43  0.23  0.03 
-5  1.14  0.87  0.59  0.32  0.05 
0  1.72  1.31  0.89  0.48  0.07 
5  2.88  2.18  1.50  0.81  0.12 
10  5.47  4.16  2.84  1.53  0.22 
15  11.72  8.90  6.09  3.28  0.47 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based on FHLBB,  "Thrift Institution Activity  in June"  (August  11, 1987). 
a.  This analysis  is not adjusted for the more than $800 million in prepaid prenmiums  that have already been  spent, 
but which  will  be  credited  against future cash  premium requirements.  Debt  coverage  ratios would  be reduced  by 
approximately 0.05 if these credits were taken into account.  Debt coverage is defined as the present value of projected 
insurance  premiums divided  by the present  value  of  projected  insurance  payments,  both discounted  at  10 percent 
annually. 
represent approximately  0.11 percent of current deposits. The table 
shows that the ability  of deposit insurance  premiums  alone to meet the 
debt  service  on FICO  bonds  is highly  sensitive  to these two assumptions. 
This exercise is relevant  to potential  holders of FICO debt, but that 
is not its primary  purpose.  After all, it is highly  unlikely  that a federally 
chartered  agency would be permitted  to default on its debt (although 
impaired  liquidity  is a possibility).  Should  premium  collections  fall  short, 
it is likely that Congress would step in to make additional  resources 
available, either to pay bondholders  directly or to defray competing 
FSLIC expenses to make  the necessary  funds available.  The important 
implication  of the exercise is that a premium  shortfall  is likely and that 
when it happens  it will trigger  another  major  initiative  in resolving  the 
ongoing  thrift  problem.  What  is difficult  to determine  is the timing. 
ALLOCATING  THE  COSTS 
Whether  the surviving  thrift  institutions  can bear the cost of closing 
insolvent thrifts is one question. Whether  they sholuld  is another. To 
address  that  issue, it is helpful  to recall  the two major  purposes  of deposit 
insurance.  The first  was to avoid  the large  social costs of runs,  to prevent 
the insolvency of some institutions from leading to runs on solvent 
institutions and disrupting  the intermediation  process and payments 
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assess the safety of depository  institutions.  In both cases, the purpose 
was to provide certain  protections for society. Nor was the insurance 
premium  established  by Congress  large:  it has  generated  FSLIC  reserves 
exceeding 2 percent of insured  deposits only twice since 1934. It does 
not seem to have been the intent of Congress that deposit-insurance 
premiums  should  cover extraordinary  expenses. 
General  tax revenues thus appear  to be a legitimate  source of funds 
for closing insured thrifts and coinmercial  banks in emergencies. Be- 
cause, in this particular  case, the industry  lobbied  for, and  won, regula- 
tory  forbearance,  with costs escalating  as a result,  it may be appropriate 
for the thrifts to bear some of the burden beyond regular  insurance 
premiums.  But even that is debatable  because until at least 1983, and 
more likely 1984, the consequences of forbearance  were only dimly 
perceived  by anyone. 
Another frequently  mentioned source of funds for the FSLIC is a 
merger  with the FDIC. The object of such a merger  is to find  funds to 
close thrifts  without having to use general revenues. But there is less 
justification  for commercial  banks to pay for failing  thrifts  than  there is 
for surviving  thrifts to pay. To the extent that growing competition 
between  banks  and  thrifts  led to thrift  failures,  having  commercial  banks 
pay for the failure is like having the victor pay the creditors of the 
vanquished.  Unless there were a mechanism  to ensure that the FDIC 
fund  would  be sufficient  to close all insolvent  banks, moreover,  it would 
be inappropriate  to merge  the funds  and  use the FDIC  to cure  part  of the 
FSLIC's deficiency, especially when the commercial  bank failure  rate 
is also high. Nevertheless, the increasing  similarity  of bank and thrift 
powers and regulations  will likely lead eventually to the consolidation 
of bank  and  thrift  regulatory  agencies, regardless  of the outcome of the 
current  thrift  crisis. 
Regulations  Developed since 1983 
Regulations  developed since 1983 can be divided into four major 
categories:  portfolio  regulation  (allowable  assets and  liabilities),  interest- 
rate-risk  regulation,  capital  requirements,  and  accounting  and appraisal 
standards.  The major  issue before the Bank Board has been how to 
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of the issue is how to curb  the risk-taking  incentives of weakened  thrifts 
without unnecessarily  restricting  healthy institutions. The distinction 
between weak and healthy  is essentially the distinction  between poorly 
and  well-capitalized  thrifts. 
Portfolio  regulation  has been addressed  primarily  through  the direct- 
investment regulations of  1985, 1986, and 1987, which limit direct 
investments  and selected loans to a fixed  percentage  of total assets or a 
multiple  of net worth, whichever  is higher.  Portfolio  regulation  has also 
been affected by the 1987  requirement  that capital  be higher  for higher 
percentages  of those assets targeted  by the direct-investment  regulation. 
These approaches  are  designed  to curtail  risk  taking  by poorly  capitalized 
thrifts  while allowing  healthy  thrifts  to diversify. 
Critics  of portfolio  regulation  point  out that  portfolio  risk  is a function 
of the variances  and covariances  of all assets and liabilities  in a firm's 
portfolio. The direct-investment  regulation  and the direct-investment 
component of the capital requirement  focus solely on the perceived 
variances  of the targeted  assets. Furthermore,  a poorly  capitalized  thrift 
with a revealed  preference  for high  risk  taking  may  be presumed  to react 
to specific asset limitations  by shifting, much as a firm  will attempt  to 
shift  the incidence  of a tax, to other  nonproscribed  assets to achieve the 
same level of risk. Direct-investment  limitations  will thus tend to be 
ineffectual  in curtailing  risk taking. In addition,  because they apply to 
well-capitalized  thrifts, they may limit the ability of those thrifts to 
diversify  their  portfolios  and  thereby  reduce  risks. 
Although  econometric  evaluations  have found a positive association 
betwen FSLIC costs and direct investments, they provide little  justifi- 
cation  for the current  approaches.  In addition,  because the fundamental 
culprit  is insolvency, the direct-investment  regulations  may give regu- 
lators a false sense of security and slow their search  for funds to close 
insolvent  thrifts  and  to build  an adequate  damage-control  apparatus. 
The second  form  of regulation  is that  aimed  to lower  interest  rate  risk. 
The Depository  Institutions  Deregulation  and Monetary  Control  Act of 
1980  and the Garn-St Germain  Act of 1982  both provided  for asset and 
liability diversification  to allow thrifts to close their interest rate gap. 
Authorization  of adjustable-rate  mortgages  created an opportunity  to 
diversify portfolios  without moving away from mortgages.  The expan- 
sion of asset powers by state regulators  for state-chartered  thrifts  also 
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The Bank  Board's  direct-investment  regulations,  however, created  a 
schism  between the Bank  Board  and state regulators.  One consequence 
was a chilling effect on diversification  because even well-capitalized 
thrifts  were aware that several nonmortgage  asset categories triggered 
alarm  among  examiners.  The Bank Board  was compounding  this effect 
by publicly  praising  the traditional  role of thrifts  in housing  finance. 
The interest  rate risk of the industry  measured  by interest rate gaps 
fell dramatically  but remained substantial. Between March 1984 and 
March  1986  the one-year  hedged  gap  fell from  40 percent  to 21 percent.32 
Given assets of approximately  $1 trillion, this means that a 100-basis- 
point increase in interest rates-a  parallel upward shift of the yield 
curve-would  reduce thrift  income approximately  $2 billion. Thus, the 
industry  is still vulnerable  to interest  rate increases. 
By setting  the ultimate  capital  requirement,  the third  form of regula- 
tion, at 6 percent, the Bank Board  was implicitly  stating  that 6 percent 
is the capital  buffer  needed to protect the FSLIC and that institutions 
below that  level ought  to be considered  supervisory  cases. The formula 
adopted  by the Bank Board  in 1986  to build  net worth  gradually  does so 
by requiring  a fraction  of average  industry  net income to be retained. 
Another  approach  would  have  been to raise  the net worth  requirement 
immediately.  That would have enabled the Bank Board to take tight 
control  of imprudent  institutions  with net worth  between 3 percent  and 
6 percent  and would have been a step toward  a better damage-control 
mechanism.  It would  also have created  a substantial  incentive  for thrifts 
to use their  ingenuity  to raise capital. The Bank Board's move to raise 
capital  requirements  was undercut  by the provision in the 1987  FSLIC 
recapitalization  legislation  allowing  thrifts  whose difficulties  are caused 
by regional  economic  slowdowns  to maintain  only 0.5 percent  net worth. 
Any institution  with a book-value  net worth  that  low is almost certainly 
market-value  insolvent.  Given  the incentive  to take  risk  when insolvent, 
this provision  is particularly  dangerous. 
The  final  type of Bank  Board  regulation  provided  for  the classification 
of assets as substandard,  doubtful,  and loss, and required  reserves at 
specified  levels  for  each  category.  In  addition,  the Bank  Board  toughened 
standards  for appraisals  to be used under  some circumstances  by thrifts. 
32. FHLBB, unpublished  data, as reported  in Brumbaugh,  Thrifts  under  Siege, table 
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The industry  reaction  has been that application  of the classification  of 
assets regulation  has been harsh and arbitrary  and that the appraisal 
requirements  are onerous. 
Policy Prescription 
A sum substantially  exceeding $10.8 billion  will be required  to close 
all insolvent thrifts.  The funds ought to and will probably  come largely 
from general  revenues. Less clear is what the optimum  flow of funding 
should be.  There is  a limit to how quickly the FSLIC can assess 
institutions and arrange  for their closure at minimum  cost. Efficient 
spending  requires  the development  of an effective triage  mechanism  to 
take control  of insolvent  institutions  and  to restrain  their  risk  taking  until 
they can be closed. The mechanism  that exists today is understaffed, 
underfunded,  and inadequate.  The Bank Board, the FSLIC, and Con- 
gress should  focus attention  and  funding  on making  the triage  mechanism 
work. 
The triage program  has three basic parts: information  gathering, 
damage control, and disposal. The current  debate has focused almost 
solely on disposal, on finding  the money to allow the FSLIC to effect 
mergers  and  liquidation  of insolvent  thrifts.  The other  two components, 
however, are equally  important. 
INFORMATION  GATHERING 
Information  gathering  relies primarily  on the Bank Board's exami- 
nation and supervisory  staffs and on financial  reporting.  Even though 
the staff of examiners  has almost doubled, from 856 in 1985  to 1519  in 
1986, it continues to be overwhelmed. Examiners  must monitor  three 
groups  of institutions:  the insolvent,  the weak, and  the remainder.  Based 
on GAAP, the first group numbered  468 in 1986. The weak included 
almost certainly  the 515 with GAAP net worth of 3 percent or less, but 
greater than double that if the cutoff is 5 percent net worth. There is 
probably  less than  one examiner  for each insolvent and weak thrift.  An 
emergency  expansion  of the staff of examiners  and their supervisors  is 
overdue. 
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reports  compiled  and evaluated  by the Office of Policy and Economic 
Research  (OPER)  in the Bank Board. In the past two years, the OPER 
staff has atrophied.  More important,  though  related, the reports  them- 
selves have not changed  to reflect  changes  in the industry.  Two modifi- 
cations  are  necessary. First, data  on relevant  lines of business should  be 
refined.  Second, wherever  feasible, market  values should be reported. 
Substantial  resources  should  be made  available  to do that  and  to rebuild 
the OPER  staff. 
Reliable information  will make damage control possible. It  can 
establish  the order  of battle  by delineating  the insolvent, the weak, and 
the strong,  and, within  that order, the major  malefactors  in risk taking. 
It then can be used to allocate examiners  and to determine  appropriate 
supervisory  actions. 
DAMAGE  CONTROL 
Effective damage control will require  increased takeovers of weak 
and insolvent thrifts. In April 1985, the Management  Consignment 
Program  (MCP)  was created  to take control  of the worst insolvent  thrifts 
that  could  not be closed because  of inadequate  FSLIC  reserves. Though 
the procedures  are complicated,  the MCP  basically  removes control  of 
an institution  from  its management  and  owners, establishes  a new board 
of directors,  and selects new management  (generally,  executives from 
stronger  thrifts).  There were twenty-nine  MCP  institutions  in 1986,  up 
from twenty-five  in 1985. Critics of the MCP charge that institutions 
remain  too long in the program  and continue to deteriorate  and to pay 
above-industry  averages  for  deposits,just as their  predecessors  did. The 
MCP,  however,  has little  alternative,  given the lack of funds  to close the 
thrifts and to provide liquidity if deposit rates fell and caused with- 
drawals.  Another  criticism  has been that the FSLIC has not developed 
management  contracts  that  establish  the proper  incentives.33 
Notwithstanding  these criticisms,  the MCP  or some successor will be 
needed  to control  the risk  taking  of hundreds  of thrifts  until  disposal  can 
be arranged.  The MCP  can also provide  valuable  information  for exam- 
iners,  supervisors,  and  policymakers  about  the conduct  and  performance 
33. Lawrence  J. White,  "Facing  the  Issues," Outlook of the Federal Home Loan Bank 
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of insolvent thrifts. It can provide, as well, first-hand  portfolio  data to 
those who ultimately  dispose of the institutions  in the program.  The 
MCP  should  be expanded. 
Damage  control  also involves  enforcement.  The  enforcement  division 
of the Bank Board was recently expanded and made an independent 
divisioni,  formally separate from the office of General Counsel. The 
primary  role of the division is to identify  fraudulent  behavior  and take 
appropriate  legal action, thus providing  a deterrent  to such conduct by 
others. This division, too, should  be expanded. 
Information  gathering  and damage  control are not addressed  by the 
FSLIC recapitalization  legislation.  They are, however, as important  as 
the recapitalization  itself. 
DISPOSAL 
Disposal  is primarily  the domain  of the FSLIC. When  the Bank  Board 
examination  staff considers  an institution  hopelessly insolvent, it tradi- 
tionally  notifies  the FSLIC and arranges  for the institution's  transfer  to 
the FSLIC caseload. The FSLIC then evaluates the thrift  and arranges 
for its disposal, primarily  through  a merger  or liquidation.  In 1986  there 
were 27 FSLIC-assisted  mergers  or other types of assistance cases and 
23 liquidations.  With  at least 341 to 468 additional  insolvent thrifts,  the 
caseload  must  increase  and  will require  more staff. 
An important,  inadequate, and generally neglected division of the 
FSLIC is the Analysis and Evaluation  Division (AED). Although  it is 
responsible  for evaluating  the portfolios  of FSLIC cases and providing 
data for the FSLIC staff that negotiates with would-be acquirers, its 
methods are simplistic and antiquated  and may have led to severe 
information  asymmetries  in the bidding  process in past mergers. The 
division should be thoroughly  overhauled and transferred  to OPER, 
where more sophisticated  staff and direction  are available  to evaluate 
the balance  sheets of FSLIC cases. 
The key to our approach  is to use information  and  damage  control  to 
establish an optimal flow of funds for disposal and to reduce overall 
disposal costs. To date, information  and damage control have been 
neglected. It may be wise to divert a nonnegligible  part of the FSLIC 
recapitalization  to the information  and  damage-control  functions;  if not, 
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Outlook 
As the thrift  industry  has moved away from its traditional  role as a 
housing  lender, the capital market  has developed alternative  means of 
channeling funds to  homebuyers. The role of thrifts and banks is 
converging,  and it is becoming  increasingly  difficult  to justify separate 
regulatory  and  deposit-insurance  systems for the two. 
THRIFT  INSTITUTION  BALANCE  SHEETS  IN  THE  EIGHTIES 
Until 1980,  the balance sheets and income statements  of thrift  insti- 
tutions were relatively simple. Assets  were primarily single-family 
mortgage  loans (some held as mortgage-backed  securities) and shoit- 
term  U.S. government  securities  (held  as a source  of liquidity).  Liabilities 
were mostly savings deposits and borrowings  from the Federal Home 
Loan Banks. Earnings  were primarily  a function  of the interest margin 
between assets and  liabilities. 
This structure  was largely the result of legislation and regulation. 
When  the rules were relaxed  in the early 1980s,  thrifts  used the oppor- 
tunity to diversify. The assets of the industry  have more than doubled 
since the beginning  of the decade, and  most of the growth  has come from 
activities not permitted  before regulatory  reform.  Because thrift  assets 
have traditionally  been long-lived, the incremental  sources of growth 
are a better  indication  of activity than  are the balance  sheet aggregates. 
Table  6 presents  a view of the thrift  industry  categorized  by activity. 
For each activity, two measures  are presented,  one based on assets and 
one based  on income. The distinction  is necessary because for activities 
such  as leasing,  the investment  precedes  the income, while  for activities 
such as mortgage  banking,  the value of the earning "asset" does not 
appear  on the balance  sheet. Although  the categories  and  the measures 
of activity are somewhat arbitrary,  they are representative  of broad 
trends  under  way in the industry. 
The table  shows that  traditional  thrift  activities  have slowed substan- 
tially  since 1980;  they are  the only activity  to have shown  a clear  decline. 
Thrifts are holding fewer mortgage  loans in their portfolios, and an 
increasing  share  of those are in the form  of mortgage-backed  securities. 
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Table 6.  Indicators of Thrift Industry Diversification, 1980 and 1986 
Percent 
End of year 
Activity  1980  1986 
Traditional thrift 
Mortgage assets  share  70.6  54.0 
Mortgage income  share  79.5  67.8 
Mortgage banking 
Net  loans  serviced/held  3.2  18.7 
Mortgage fee income  share  4.8  9.6 
Trading 
Investment  assets  share  0.5  4.2 
Investment  income  share  9.9  11.1 
Real estate  development 
Real estate  assets  share  13.6  22.6 
Real estate  income  share  0.5  0.5 
Banking 
Nonmortgage  loan assets  share  1.4  5.6 
Nonmortgage  income  share  3.6  7.3 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  as described  in the text based on FHLBB,  unpublished data. 
Mortgage  banking  activity  has  increased.  Fee income  from  origination 
and servicing has become an important  source of revenues. Another 
measure  of mortgage  banking,  the value of loans serviced  for others, net 
of loans serviced  by others, has increased  nearly  500  percent  as a share 
of total loans held. 
Some thrifts  have shifted their asset mix away from mortgage  loans 
toward  investment  securities, earning  income from  the spread  between 
asset yield  and  the  cost of liabilities  and  recording  gains  when  appreciated 
investments  can  be sold at a profit.  Both measures  have shown  increases 
since 1980. 
The share  of assets devoted to real  estate development  has increased 
66 percent since 1980.  Gross revenues from real estate activity are not 
reported  separately,  nor  are  revenues  from  service  corporations  engaged 
in real estate development  identified.  Only net income is shown in the 
table, and that has not risen because of substantial  losses by thrifts  in 
many  areas  of the country. 
Thrifts  are also beginning  to offer a full range  of nonmortgage  loans, 
paralleling  the services provided by commercial  banks. The share of 
nonmortgage  loan assets has increased  300 percent, while the revenue 
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INFORMATION,  MORTGAGE-BACKED  SECURITIES,  AND  THRIFT 
REGULATION 
Financial  intermediaries  exist essentially  because of imperfect  infor- 
mation  between borrowers  and lenders. If borrowers  and lenders  knew 
who each other  were and  could assess each others'  financial  capabilities 
and  needs, no need would  exist for financial  intermediaries.  Information 
among  borrowers  and lenders  is improving.  One reflection  of that  is the 
expanding  market  for securities  backed by the assets traditionally  held 
in portfolio  by thrifts  and banks. Mortgage-backed  securities were the 
first  asset-backed  security  and  are the most developed. 
In 1986,  58 percent  ($257  billion)  of all one- to four-family  mortgages 
originated  in the United States were sold in the secondary  market  and 
became part of mortgage-backed  securities. Only 17 percent of such 
mortgages  were  sold  in  the secondary  market  in 1980.  By 1986,34  percent 
($518 billion) of  the total one- to  four-family mortgage stock was 
securitized,  up from 12  percent  in 1980.34 
Through  the purchase of mortgage-backed  securities, the capital 
market  is supplanting  thrifts as the chief holder of mortgages-the 
traditional  role that differentiated  thrifts  from other intermediaries  and 
created  their  vulnerability  to rising  interest  rates. Early  in this transition, 
some  analysts  worried  that  if thrifts  ceased to hold  mortgages,  the supply 
of housing  finance  would decline. But from 1979  to 1986  the total dollar 
volume of residential  mortgages  nearly doubled while thrifts' share of 
holdings  dropped  from 51 percent to 34 percent. If mortgage-backed 
securities  are allocated  to the holders, the thrifts'  shares  are higher,  but 
show a comparable  decline.35 
The market  for mortgage-backed  securities has proved remarkably 
adaptable.  One of the drawbacks  of the original  mortgage-backed  secu- 
rities was that unexpected principal  repayments  led to uncertain  cash 
flows in the securities. In 1983, a new security called a Collateralized 
Mortgage  Obligation  (CMO)  was introduced  to alleviate cash-flow  un- 
certainty.  Generally,  a CMO  will separate  a mortgage  pool into several 
security  classes or tranches  and direct interest and principal  payments 
34. Brumbaugh,  Thrifts  under  Siege, table  7-2 and  chap. 7, p. 8. 
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to fast-pay  and slow-pay  tranches.  From  mid-1983  through  the first  half 
of 1987,  $116  billion  in CMOs  had  been issued.36 
CONCLUSIONS 
The diversification  of thrift  activities and the development  of mort- 
gage-backed  securities have eliminated  much of the justification  for a 
government-facilitated  specialized  housing  finance  lender  called  a thrift. 
The regulatory  implication  is that  government-influenced  balance-sheet 
differences between thrifts and banks should be eliminated. Without 
balance-sheet  differences, the justification  for separate  regulatory  and 
deposit-insurance  agencies is also eliminated.  As thrift  balance sheets 
become more like bank balance sheets, regulation  of thrifts should be 
folded into the bank  regulatory  apparatus.  Now is the time to begin. 
Although thrifts have so far been affected more than commercial 
banks have by the rapidly  improving  information  between borrowers 
and lenders, banks will ultimately  be equally hard hit. Asset-backed 
securities have expanded from single-family  fixed-rate mortgages to 
multifamily  mortgages, adjustable-rate  mortgages, commercial mort- 
gages, car  and  light  truck  loans, and  credit  card  receivables.  Commercial 
paper,  once issued by only the largest  corporations,  is now being  issued 
by smaller companies. It is becoming difficult to imagine financial- 
intermediary  assets that will be immune  to the increasingly  improving 
information  between  borrowers  and  lenders.  As asset-backed  securities 
erode  intermediary  assets, revenue  from  those assets will  fall. The short- 
run effect will be to intensify  incentives for cost reduction.  Ultimately, 
however, the revenue reduction  will force intermediaries  to diversify 
further,  posing  increasingly  difficult  problems  for regulators. 
As that scenario  unfolds, it will be useful to recall the lessons of the 
thrift  industry  crisis. Resisting  the deregulation  of balance  sheets in the 
face of changing  economic and technological conditions is futile and 
costly. When institutions deteriorate  because of changing economic 
forces, forbearance  is also costly. Lowering  net worth  requirements  and 
relaxing  accounting  standards,  for example, undermine  monitoring  and 
control, giving  rise to incentives  to take greater  risks  and  facilitating  the 
risk taking. Instead, net worth requirements  should be maintained  at 
levels that  reduce  moral  hazard  and  provide  the deposit  insurance  agency 
36. First  Boston  Corporation,  CMO  Quarterly  (September  1987),  p. 1. R. Dan Brumbaugh, Jr. and Andrewv  S.  Carron  377 
a substantial  buffer against unexpected adverse events. When institu- 
tions fall below the requirement,  intense examiner and supervisory 
scrutiny  is essential. The increasing  pressure  on balance  sheets suggests 
the need to reform  accounting  and reporting  requirements,  especially 
the development of  market values. Whenever possible, a financial 
intermediary  should  report  the marked-to-market  value of its assets and 
liabilities. 
Strict  net worth  requirements  and  accounting  standards  are essential 
for developing  an adequate  closure rule, without which regulators  are 
likely to repeat  the worst error  made  in the thrift  industry  crisis:  waiting 
to close institutions  until  their  market  value  was  already  negative.  Closing 
an institution  before its market  value is exhausted avoids substantial 
rescue costs. If we are correct about the threat  to thrifts  and banks of 
improving  information,  Congress should address these issues with a 
sense of urgency. 
EPILOGUE 
Although we have taken for granted the continuation of deposit 
insurance,  it is worth  questioning  whether  it continues  to be appropriate. 
It may be that the government  can assure greater  future stability  with 
less of a contingent  liability  for itself by requiring  substantial  minimum 
net worth for formerly insured institutions, by demanding  improved 
financial  reporting  and accounting, and by closing-probably through 
the Federal  Reserve Board-institutions with positive but diminishing 
net worth.37 
In contemplating  such an apparently  dramatic  change, it may be well 
to observe that financial  stability  today is less a function  of the deposit 
insurance  agency funds than of the perceived willingness  and ability  of 
Congress  to place  the full  faith  and  credit  of the U.S. government  behind 
guaranteed  deposits.  Credible  protection  against  loss is what  is important 
to depositors,  not whether  it is accomplished  through  an insurance  fund 
or stricter regulation. Closure of insolvent institutions with public 
confidence in the remaining  open, solvent institutions would protect 
against  the prospect  of destabilizing  runs. 
37. This approach  was previously  described  in John H. Kareken  and Neil Wallace, 
"Deposit  Insurance  and  Bank  Regulation:  A Partial  Equilibrium  Exposition,"  Journial of 
Business, vol. 51 (July  1978),  pp. 413-38. Comments 
and Discussion 
Dwight M. Jaffee: Andrew  Carron  and  Dan Brumbaugh  have prepared 
an excellent paper,  using good  judgment  regarding  what to omit as well 
as what to include. The result is an accurate, concise, and stimulating 
account  of the current  thrift  crisis. 
Overall,  I agree  with most  of their  main  conclusions, although  I would 
have stated several  of them more strongly.  This difference  is illustrated 
in the following  three points, for each of which I briefly  summarize  the 
authors'  position  and  then give my own stronger  version. 
First, the authors  argue that the procedures  used by FSLIC during 
the crisis  had  serious  flaws,  especially  its closure  rules-the  rules  FSLIC 
uses to determine  when to close sick thrifts-which allowed sick insti- 
tutions  to operate  much  too long. Instead,  they say, FSLIC should  have 
enforced stricter  net worth standards,  and it should  be doing so now as 
well. I would say that FSLIC's performance  during  the crisis was a 
disaster. 
Second, the authors  indicate  that the unique  function and structure 
of thrift  institutions  is disappearing.  I would say that there is no longer 
any distinctive  role for thrift  institutions. 
Third, the authors note that the purpose of deposit insurance is 
changing.  I would say that  the deposit insurance  system urgently  needs 
a major  overhaul. 
As a result of these differences, the authors and I come down on 
different  sides of one major  issue, whether  or not it would have been- 
or still is-a  good idea to merge  FSLIC into FDIC. We all agree  that  the 
new FSLIC restructuring  plan provides but a slender  safety margin  for 
FSLIC and the thrifts  to service the interest  on the debt to be issued as 
part  of the plan. However, I feel that merging  FSLIC into FDIC is a far 
better solution to the crisis than is restructuring  FSLIC, whereas the 
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authors  are not as positive about a merger  of the two deposit insurance 
funds. 
My case for merging  FSLIC into FDIC depends on the three points 
listed above, so I will now briefly  expand  on each. 
FSLIC has been badly managed  since the beginning  of the crisis, as 
is reflected  in the high  price  we must  now pay to bail it out. The problem 
is that, by law, the board members of the Federal Home Loan Bank 
Board system are also the directors  of FSLIC. A fundamental  conflict 
of interest  is built  into the system. FHLBB board  members  should, and 
certainly  do, give priority  to the survival of thrift  institutions;  FSLIC 
board members should give priority to the survival of FSLIC. The 
conflict  is particularly  evident during  a crisis that threatens  the survival 
of both FSLIC  and  the thrifts. 
From  the beginning,  this overlapping  structure  has been reflected  in 
FSLIC's strategy  for dealing  with the crisis. This strategy  was to delay 
closing  institutions  as long as possible, hoping  that  falling  interest  rates 
would solve the problems. Ironically, even though the interest rate 
gamble  worked,  with interest  rates falling  much  more than  most people 
would have expected, the remaining  problems  are worse than anyone 
expected. FSLIC is just unwilling  to grapple  with the, admittedly,  hard 
and dirty  business of closing sick institutions.  Carron  and Brumbaugh 
are right  in relating  the escalating  problems  to the "moral  hazard" of 
sick institutions,  but there is also a moral  hazard  in having  a regulator 
with two hats. 
In arguing  that thrift institutions  no longer have a distinctive role, 
Carron  and  Brumbaugh  point out that deregulation  now allows thrifts  to 
behave more  like commercial  banks;  that innovations  such as "securi- 
tization"  give  the  thrifts  a  means for  doing  so; and  that  the  transformation 
of thrifts  is really  happening. 
I think  it is important  to add that the historical  basis for the special 
role of thrifts, the priority accorded low-cost mortgage  financing  for 
single-family  housing  in the United States, has all but disappeared.  Two 
things  have really  happened.  First, Congress,  and certainly  the present 
administration,  is no longer  pushing  housing  as a social  priority.  Second, 
mortgage  banking  is now an attractive  and highly  competitive  business. 
Thrifts  are still big players in this business, but so are General  Motors 
and  General  Electric.  In fact, thrifts  are  now trying  to limit  the activities 
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Home Loan Mortgage  Corporation  (FHLMC)  so that  these agencies  will 
not be of as much  help to competing  mortgage  bankers. 
While  I think  it is right  to argue  that  thrifts  and  commercial  banks  will 
soon be indistinguishable,  we should  not lose sight of the fact that both 
of these institutions  also compete with money market  funds. Although 
the respective market  shares seem to have stabilized  for the moment, 
ultimately  I expect all banking  institutions  will look more like money 
market funds. A key point is that our banking institutions are very 
expensive to operate:  they need a spread  of 2 percentage  points or more 
to break  even. Given a choice, I think  consumers  will go for lower-cost 
models. 
In discussing  the FSLIC restructuring  plan, Carron  and Brumbaugh 
seem to be saying that everyone realizes that taxpayer money will be 
needed eventually to bail out FSLIC. We may all know this, but this 
view is certainly  not  being  reflected  in  policy. As a good  example,  current 
policy gives the impression  that deposit insurance  is "mutual" insur- 
ance-the  surviving institutions  will pay for the failing ones. This is 
reflected,  for instance, in the supplementary  premiums  that thrifts  now 
have to pay for FSLIC insurance  and in the use of FHLBB net worth- 
arguably  owned by the thrifts-to  provide the equity for the FSLIC 
restructuring. 
There  are strategic  reasons  for  portraying  FSLIC  insurance  as mutual 
insurance.  It suggests  that FSLIC and  the thrift  industry  can solve their 
own problems, helping them make the case that they should remain 
independent.  It also keeps the costs of restructuring  FSLIC out of the 
government  budget. 
However, treating  the deposit  insurance  fund  as a mutual  plan  is likely 
to create  serious  problems.  For  one thing,  bank  runs  become more  likely 
because people will recognize that mutual insurance  will not work if 
every bank  is suspect. A similar  outcome was observed recently in the 
states of Ohio  and  Maryland,  where  inadequate  insurance  funds  actually 
created bank runs. For another thing, it is easy to imagine a vicious 
circle in which the sick thrifts  bring  down the sound thrifts  with them 
and sink the whole industry.  As a result. sound thrifts  have an obvious 
incentive to pull out of FSLIC and in fact are already  looking for bank 
mergerpartners  or  negotiating  "exit  fees, " cash settlements  with  FSLIC, 
in order  to withdraw. 
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insuring  institutions  primarily  against  bank  runs. Instead,  FSLIC  is now 
insuring institutions primarily  against losses  created by credit risk, 
interest  rate  risk, and  fraud.  There  is a big difference  between providing 
insurance  against  bank runs, which I do not think is too hard  and may 
not  even be necessary,  and  providing  insurance  against  credit  and  interest 
rate risk, which cannot work in the manner  of current  federal deposit 
insurance. So sometime soon we will have to overhaul the deposit 
insurance  system. 
The possibilities for reform are numerous, but let me just raise an 
extreme  alternative.  Most mutual  funds-both  money market  and  bond 
and stock funds-operate without  any deposit insurance  and  have done 
just fine. In particular,  runs on mutual funds do not occur because 
investors  recognize (or think)  that they can always sell or redeem  their 
shares,  albeit  at prices  that  properly  reflect  the value  of the assets owned 
by the fund. As a result, investors want to know what they are buying, 
fund charters are specific about the allowable assets,  and cautious 
investors  buy funds  with safe assets. 
My conclusion is that the FSLIC crisis would be better resolved by 
merging  FSLIC into FDIC than by restructuring  FSLIC according  to 
the current  plan. I see several  advantages.  First, the current  FSLIC  plan 
is an open invitation  for FSLIC managers  to continue  to operate  just as 
they have for the past five years, resolving  cases in the best interests  of 
thrifts  more  than  in the best interests  of FSLIC. This approach  is fine if 
FSLIC really is a mutual  insurance  fund, but we know that it is not. 
Second, if there  is no special  role for thrifts,  then there  is no need for the 
additional  expense of running  two parallel  networks  of insurance  funds 
and regulatory  apparatus.  And, third, it will be easier to overhaul  one 
deposit insurance  fund than to overhaul  two of them, especially given 
that  one of them  is bankrupt. 
William  Poole: Andrew  Carron  and  Dan  Brumbaugh  provide  a thorough 
examination  of an important  and  difficult  policy problem.  A large  part  of 
the thrift  industry  is bankrupt,  FSLIC  is bankrupt,  and  the federal  policy 
to deal  with  the mess is in disarray.  The authors  discuss the current  state 
of the industry, how it got into such a mess, and what the federal 
government  should  do about  it. I will summarize  the key features  of their 
analysis  and  add  my own comments  as I do so. 
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some accounting  issues. Three  different  accounting  systems are used to 
measure the balance sheet of a thrift. The first involves regulatory 
accounting  principles  (RAP).  The second system is known  as generally 
accepted accounting  principles  (GAAP). The authors  discuss some of 
the differences  between these two sets of accounting  principles.  A third 
system, marking  assets and liabilities  to their market  values, provides 
the most accurate  picture  of a firm's  condition  whenever  it is possible to 
obtain reasonably  good estimates of the market  values. Market-value 
accounting  is universally  used by investment  companies  such as mutual 
funds; these firms strike a new balance sheet at the end of every day 
based on the closing prices of the assets in their portfolios. The main 
problem  with market-value  accounting  is that  it may be quite  difficult  to 
measure  the value  of certain  assets for  which  no organized  market  trading 
exists. 
The thrifts,  and many  other  regulated  financial  firms,  use accounting 
principles determined by their regulators. These principles evolved 
many years ago based on the view that these firms, most of which are 
highly  leveraged, should not be required  to show transitory  changes in 
asset values. The assumption  was that a temporary  fall in asset values 
would wipe out reported  net worth  and  lead to runs  by depositors. This 
accounting  principle would be satisfactory if it were really true that 
changes  in asset values display  a high  degree of negative serial  correla- 
tion. However, finance  research  over the past  twenty-five  years  has built 
an overpowering  case that changes in asset values are best considered 
permanent  at the time they occur. 
Regulatory  accounting  principles,  then, are  based  on a fundamentally 
flawed  economic  theory  of how asset values  behave. RAP  is responsible, 
I believe, for much of the problem  we see today in the thrift  industry. 
Employing  RAP  has  permitted  firms,  regulators,  and  Congress  to believe 
that  problems  were much  smaller  than  they actually  were and  to believe 
that losses might well be reversed. These accounting  principles have 
also permitted  thrifts  to pursue  portfolio  policies that would  be discour- 
aged if they were routinely  exposed under  market-value  accounting. 
RAP not only misstates  balance  sheet positions  but also permits  wide 
latitude  for manipulating  income statements. A thrift  can report  earn- 
ings-RAP  earnings-by selling  assets that  happen  to show capital  gains 
while continuing  to hold assets that show capital  losses. Thus, the thrift 
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were in fact sustained. This freedom to manipulate  both the balance 
sheet and the income statement means that regulatory accounting 
principles  are  really  creative  regulatory  accounting  principles,  or CRAP. 
The thrifts'  earnings  data  reported  by Carron  and  Brumbaugh  in table 
4 and  in the text are  misleading.  It would  be useful  if their  paper  included 
tables reporting  estimates of income on a true economic basis-that  is, 
income reflecting  unrealized  capital gains and losses. It would also be 
useful to have a table reporting  annual  balance sheet data  from 1965  to 
date on a market-value  basis. These data would provide a far more 
accurate  picture  of the state of the industry  than  we have at present. 
Some 35 percent of the thrift  institutions  existing in 1980  no longer 
exist, having  disappeared  through  mergers  and  liquidations.  Moreover, 
of the 3,000 thrifts  in existence at the end of 1986,  about 350 are surely 
insolvent and another  600 are probably  insolvent. That is, about one- 
third  of the thrifts  whose doors are now open would in fact be closed 
down tomorrow  if we were to insist that a thrift  maintain  positive net 
worth  at  the  current  market  values  of assets and  liabilities.  The  magnitude 
of the disaster that has hit this industry is astonishing. Of course, if 
interest  rates continue to rise as they have so far this year, even more 
thrifts  will go under. 
Early  in their  paper  Carron  and Brumbaugh  say that "relaxed safety 
and soundness  controls  . . . caused,  or at least facilitated,  the current 
crisis." At the end of the paper they say that deposit insurance  itself 
may be the villain. This conclusion arises from the fact that deposit 
insurance  provides a perverse incentive for a thrift's management  to 
increase  risk  when the thrift  is already  insolvent  or nearly  so. 
In my view, the problem  is much deeper than the authors suggest, 
and  the  policy  errors  occurred  much  longer  ago. Throughout  the postwar 
period  the thrift  industry  has relied  heavily on the political  power of the 
housing  lobby. From the end of World  War II until 1965  the industry 
operated  in a favorable  economic and  political  environment.  Long-term 
interest  rates were almost always higher  than short-term  rates, and the 
industry  prospered  by borrowing  short and lending  long. Interest  rates 
rose gradually  over this period, but the increase in long rates never 
occurred  rapidly  enough  to cause a serious deterioration  in the value of 
home  mortgages  in the thrifts'  portfolios. 
The thrifts  benefited  from  a number  of federal  policies. They enjoyed 
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mercial  banks  but  not to thrifts.  Government  policy encouraged  a steady 
supply of high-quality  mortgages.  Urban  expressway construction  en- 
couraged  home building  in the suburbs,  and many of the mortgages  on 
these new houses were insured  by the FHA. Cranky  fiscal  conservatives 
were about the only ones worried  that an institution  issuing long-term 
mortgages  financed  by demand  money was inherently  unsound. 
When interest rates rose sharply in the credit crunch of 1966 the 
federal government  rode quickly to the rescue. Regulation  Q ceilings 
were extended to the thrifts  to prevent the more aggressive  ones from 
bidding  money away from other members  of the industry.  The ceiling 
applied  to the thrifts  was set a little higher  than the ceiling applying  to 
commercial  banks  so that  the thrifts  would  have a competitive  advantage 
in  attracting  funds.  Throughout  the 1970s  Regulation  Q was administered 
in a conscious effort  to protect  the health  of the thrift  industry. 
Of course, other elements of public policy prevented the industry 
from  saving  itself. There  were legal  impediments  or outright  prohibitions 
on issuance  of variable-rate  mortgages.  Some of these restrictions  were 
at the federal  level and some at the state level. For example, Vermont 
once raised  its usury  ceiling  on mortgages  while  providing  that  the higher 
ceiling  would not apply  to variable-rate  mortgages.  Actions of this type 
were taken in the name of consumer protection. Also, as the authors 
point  out, the industry  could not diversify  its portfolio  because portfolio 
restrictions  held it to investing  almost  exclusively in home mortgages. 
In the 1970s  the thrift  industry  and  its supporters  underestimated  the 
force of competition.  Especially  in the late 1970s  money market  mutual 
funds grew rapidly, and no amount of tinkering with Regulation Q 
ceilings could hold off the onslaught  of that competition. The conse- 
quences  of mismatched  asset and  liability  maturity  structures  came  home 
to roost. By 1981  interest rates had gone so high and the pressure  had 
been on for so long that  the crisis  broke  into the open. By this time many 
thrifts  had exhausted  their ways of reporting  satisfactory  earnings  and 
satisfactory  capital. The federal government  came to the rescue again 
with  relaxed  capital  requirements  and  funny  money  called  income  capital 
certificates  and  net worth  certificates.  The blatant  tax subsidy  called  the 
All Savers Certificate  provided a low-interest source of funds to the 
thrifts  because the interest  was tax free to those buying  the certificates. 
Even though interest rates declined sharply after mid-1982, the 
government  rescue remains  incomplete.  Indeed,  some of the steps taken 
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by permitting  nearly  insolvent  institutions  to remain  open, the regulators 
have encouraged  additional  excessive risk taking  on the part of thrifts 
trying  desperately  to save themselves. 
So, where are we today? The first shoe has dropped.  A large  part  of 
the industry  has closed and  FSLIC  is bankrupt.  The second shoe is soon 
to hit the ground.  Somebody  is going  to lose money, and  a lot of it. 
Before asking who should pay we must be clear about who can be 
made  to pay. The government's  present  approach  involves advances  of 
funds from the Treasury with the expectation that the funds will be 
repaid  through  deposit  insurance  premiums  on the surviving  thrifts.  That 
solution  may simply  not be feasible. Carron  and Brumbaugh  argue  that 
the amounts involved are so large that they may well cause deposit 
insurance  premiums  to be too high to be sustainable.  After all, firms  in 
the thrift  industry  have the option  to restructure  themselves as commer- 
cial banks. Or, if that avenue of escape is cut off through  changes in the 
chartering  rules, the return  in the business may be too low to attract 
depositors  and  investors. 
The authors argue that the funds to bail out the insolvent firms in 
order to pay off insured deposits "ought to and probably will come 
largely from general revenues." I would have no quarrel with this 
judgment if the case of the thrifts stood alone. However, because it 
almost  surely  does not, we need to be concerned  about  the general  issue 
of bailouts. After all, the Pension Benefit Guaranty  Corporation  is in 
trouble;  there are suggestions  that the federal  government  should help 
to bail  out the ailing  steel industry;  many  large  banks  are  in trouble  from 
LDC, energy, and agricultural  loans. And I am sure that around  this 
table  we can come up with a dozen more  potential  bailout  situations. 
The issue here is one of political  economy. Can  we fashion  a solution 
to the thrifts'  problem  that reduces the incentive for other industries  to 
behave  in ways that  may eventually  require  bailouts?  My own  judgment 
is that the federal government should drive a very hard bargain to 
minimize  the bailout  precedent.  The bargain  should  load as much  of the 
cost as possible on the thrift  industry.  In fact, the government  should 
assess more  than  it is likely to collect. 
Driving  a hard  bargain  may be the only way to obtain  two essential 
long-run  reforms  in the structure  of the thrift  industry  and  its regulation. 
First, the industry  needs a larger  base of uninsured  capital.  This capital 
could consist of equity, uninsured  capital  notes, or uninsured  deposits. 
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requirements  mean little unless assets and liabilities are marked to 
market. 
The thrift  industry  as we knew it from 1945  to 1980  is dead. Capital 
accumulated  during  the favorable  years before 1965  was exhausted by 
the interest  rate increases in the 1970s  and early 1980s.  There may well 
be a place for firms  specializing  in housing  finance, but the decision on 
the matter  should be made by the market  within the context of public 
policies that maintain  a "level playing  field." In any event, all financial 
firms  must  maintain  a reasonable  maturity  match  on the asset and  liability 
sides of the balance sheet, or use various  financial  instruments  such as 
futures  and  options  to hedge  a mismatch.  Given  the  politics  of the  present 
situation,  I see no orderly  way for government  policy to force thrifts  to 
structure  their  balance  sheets properly.  To reach the desirable  end, the 
government  will have to pressure  the industry  to accept major  reforms. 
The government  in the end will have to pay, but it should agree to pay 
only if the industry  accepts those reforms. 
If the industry  will not accept reforms,  then government  attempts  to 
collect may  well force most traditional  thrifts  to recharter  as commercial 
banks or to go out of business. Such an outcome would solve the 
problem.  That  solution,  however unsatisfactory,  would  be better  than  a 
continuing  governmental  obligation  to pay for the inevitable  losses that 
will occur from time to time in firms  with highly mismatched  asset and 
liability  maturity  structures. 
General Discussion 
James  Duesenberry  agreed  with the authors  that the performance  of 
the U.S. thrift  industry  as a whole has been dismal, but said it should 
not be forgotten  that some institutions,  and indeed some entire  regions, 
have performed  well. Massachusetts  thrift  institutions  provide  one such 
example. In Massachusetts,  thrifts  benefited  from  the early  introduction 
of variable-rate  mortgages  and from diversification  by consumer and 
security lending activities that were not allowed in other regions. 
Furthermore,  participation  in a mutual  insurance  fund  provided  a reason 
for Massachusetts  thrifts  to accept greater  supervision  and monitoring 
of fellow members. According to Duesenberry, the experience of the 
Massachusetts  thrifts  indicates  that the problems  experienced  by insol- 
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Duesenberry also emphasized the political origin of some of the 
industry's  problems.  Unlike the FDIC, which is under  the control  of an 
independent  board  of directors,  FSLIC  is a creature  of Congress,  which 
must approve funds for examinations  and other enforcement mecha- 
nisms. In his opinion,  this dependence  creates a conflict  of interest.  The 
real estate industry  has substantial  political clout and its own special 
interests in the thrift industry. This helps explain both Congress's 
reluctance  to authorize  funds for FSLIC enforcement  of industry  stan- 
dards  and  its lack of enthusiasm  for regulatory  reform,  when these seem 
at variance with the housing industry's self-interest. John Kareken 
agreed  with  the thrust  of Duesenberry's  remarks,  noting  that  the  position 
of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board was compromised  by its dual 
role as advocate and regulator  of the industry.  Hence he believes that 
the housing industry and Congress bear some responsibility for the 
current  crisis. 
A number  of participants  discussed the future  of the thrift  industry. 
Robert  Hall argued  that the industry  is an anachronism  and that raising 
deposit insurance premiums would only accelerate its  demise and 
replacement  by more  efficient  institutions.  He suggested  that  the deposit- 
taking  and lending  activities of the thrifts  could be readily  replaced  by 
mutual  funds and the mortgage-backed  securities market.  He observed 
that according  to Dwight Jaffee's data, mutual  funds are more efficient 
than  thrifts,  requiring  a smaller  interest-rate  spread  to operate  profitably. 
In addition,  he noted, mutual  funds  would not require  deposit  insurance 
against runs, since they do not issue a face-value liability. Hall also 
observed that the mortgage origination  function of thrifts was being 
replaced by mortgage brokers and the secondary market. Anthony 
Downs, on the other  hand,  was concerned  about  the prospect  of a rapid 
demise  of thrift  institutions,  expressing  skepticism  about  the capacity  of 
the secondary market  and mutual  funds to absorb the $800 billion in 
mortgages  currently  held by the thrifts. 
Duesenberry  disagreed  with the view that the specialized  role of the 
thrift  industry  was now obsolete. He argued  that the traditional  thrift 
role of evaluating  credit risk continues to be important  and that an 
institutional  arrangement  in which such judgments are backed with 
capital avoids moral hazard. In his assessment, the move towards 
mortgage-backed  securities and securitization  in other forms of credit 
will result  in a deterioration  in the quality  of these instruments  since the 
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disagreed,  arguing  that  third-party  guarantors  had  an  incentive  to ensure 
that quality standards are maintained. He also believes that in the 
"senior/subordinated"  financial  structures  currently  in use, the origi- 
nator of the loan retains a sufficient interest to avoid this problem. 
William  Brainard  agreed  with Duesenberry  about  the continuing  role  for 
thrifts,  emphasizing  the historical  role of the thrifts  in converting  illiquid 
assets into a liability of certain capital value. He noted that although 
mutual  funds  could grow  to hold the mortgages  now held  by thrifts,  their 
"deposit" liabilities,  unlike  thrifts',  would not be of fixed capital  value. 
The elimination  of thrifts  would  be contractionary  unless  the  government 
or Federal Reserve were to engage in extremely large market  transac- 
tions, buying  longer-term  securities  and  issuing short  securities  to serve 
as an enlarged  base for money market  funds. 
In Alan Blinder's view,  a better understanding  of forces in the 
historical  development  of the thrift  industry  is a prerequisite  to assessing 
the importance of its future role. In the United States and in other 
countries, the function  of lending  in customer  markets  and the function 
of  providing liabilities that serve as  money, or near money, have 
traditionally  been combined  in the same enterprises.  Blinder  observed 
that although  there are examples  of businesses that serve only one role, 
the dominant  form combines the two functions. In his view, until it is 
clear whether this regularity  has been the result of market  forces or of 
the regulatory  environment,  and until it is clear what the appropriate 
role of regulation  itself should be when the private creation of near 
monies is involved, it will not be possible to say whether  the demise of 
thrifts  is desirable. 